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Abstract 
We present a protocol enabling two legitimate partners sharing an 
initial secret to mutually authenticate and to exchange an encryption 
session key. The opponent is an active Man In The Middle (MITM) 
with unlimited calculation and storage capacities. The resistance to 
unlimitedly powered MITM is obtained through the combined use of 
Deep Random secrecy, formerly introduced [9] and proved as 
unconditionally secure against passive opponent for key exchange, 
and universal hash techniques. We prove the resistance to MITM 
interception attacks, and show that (i) upon successful completion, the 
protocol leaks no residual information about the current value of the 
shared secret to the opponent, and (ii) that any unsuccessful 
completion is detectable by the legitimate partners. We also discuss 
implementation techniques. 
 
Key words. Deep Random, zero knowledge authentication, Man In The Middle attack, secret key 
agreement, key exchange protocol, unconditional security, quantum resistant 
I. Introduction and summary of former work 
Modern cryptography mostly relies on mathematical problems commonly trusted as very difficult to 
solve, such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithm, belonging to complexity theory. No 
certainty exists on the actual difficulty of those problems. Some other methods, rather based on 
information theory, have been developed since early 90’s. Those methods relies on hypothesis about 
the opponent (such as « memory bounded » adversary [6]) or about the communication channel (such 
as « independent noisy channels » [5]) ; unfortunately, if their perfect secrecy have been proven under 
given hypothesis, none of those hypothesis are easy to ensure in practice. At last, some other methods 
based on physical theories like quantum indetermination [3] or chaos generation have been described 
and experimented, but they are complex to implement, and, again, relies on solid but not proven and 
still partly understood theories. 
Considering this theoretically unsatisfying situation, we have proposed in [9] to explore a new path, 
where proven information theoretic security can be reached, without assuming any limitation about the 
opponent, who is supposed to have unlimited calculation and storage power, nor about the 
communication channel, that is supposed to be perfectly public, accessible and equivalent for any 
playing party (legitimate partners and opponents). Furthermore, while we were only considering 
passive unlimited opponents in [9], we consider in this work active unlimited MITM opponents. 
  
In our model of security, the legitimate partners of the protocol are using Deep Random generation to 
generate their shared encryption key, and the behavior of the opponent, when inferring from public 
information, is governed by Deep Random assumption, that we introduce. The legitimate partners 
have an initial shared authentication secret, that is used only for authentication purpose, not for 
generating the shared encryption key. 
Our protocol is original because it resists to opponents that are both unlimited and active MITM. A 
scheme like Wigner-Carter Authentication [11] is secure against unlimited opponent but not in a 
MITM scenario. WCA can however be secure against MITM in the specific case of QKD because of 
the non-cloning theorem. Public Key schemes can be resistant to MITM opponent but not if they are 
unlimited. Methods like tamper detection by latency examination [12] are not robust enough and not 
resistant to unlimited opponents. 
 
Back on the Deep random assumption 
We have introduced in [9] the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability theory as 
developed by Jaynes [7]. Deep Random assumption is an objective principle to assign probability, 
compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by Jaynes [7]. 
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory. 
If we denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability 
distribution of a certain random variable   (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of 
that variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  , it is then 
possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information      
   regarding an experiment of  ; we denote this set of possible distributions as: 
   
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning 
in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider 
groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable  , that do not change 
the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation   of such group, the 
observer has no information enabling him to privilege   ( )   (   | ) rather than     ( )  
 (   ( )| ) as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7]. 
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and 
bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups   as the ones fulfilling 
the 2 conditions below: 
(  ) Stability - For any distribution      , and for any transformation    , then         
(  ) Convexity - Any distribution that is invariant by action of   does belong to    
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of   is exactly: 
  ( )  {
 
| |
∑    
   
|      } 
  
For any group   of transformations applying on the sample space  , we denote by   ( ) the set of all 
possible conditional expectations when the distribution of   courses   ( ). In other words: 
  ( )  { ( )   [ | ]|      ( )} 
Or also: 
  ( )  { ( )  ∫   ( )  
 
 
|      ( )} 
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if     , the strategy    of the opponent observer  , 
in order to estimate   from the public information  , should be chosen by the opponent observer   
within the restricted set of strategies: 
     ( )                                                                      ( ) 
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of   to choose his 
strategy in order estimate the private information   from his knowledge of the public information  . It 
is a fully reasonable assumption because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action 
of a transformation that let the distribution uncertainty unchanged. 
( ) suggests of course that    should eventually be picked in ⋂   ( )    , but it is enough for our 
purpose to find at least one group of transformation with which one can apply efficiently the Deep 
Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an advantage distilled by the legitimate 
partners compared to the opponent. 
Back on the presentation of protocol  (introduced in [9]) 
The following protocol has been presented in [9]. In order to shortly remind the notations, the sample 
space of the distribution of the private information (for   or  ) is  [   ] . Considering   (       ) 
and   (       ) some parameter vectors in [   ]
  and   (       ) and   (       ) some 
Bernoulli experiment vectors in {   } , we denote : 
    (resp.    ) the scalar product of   and   (resp.   and  ) 
| |  ∑   
 
    ; | |  ∑   
 
    
     ,  ( ) represents (  ( )     ( )) 
 
 
 represents (
  
 
   
  
 
) for     
  
In that protocol, besides being hidden to any third party (opponent or partner), the probability 
distribution used by each legitimate partner also needs to have specific properties in order to prevent 
the opponent to efficiently evaluate    by using internal symmetry of the distribution. 
Those specific properties are: 
(i) Each probability distribution   (for   or  ) must be « far » from its symmetric projection 
 ̅( )  
 
  
∑    ( )     
(ii) At least one of the distribution (of   or  ) must avoid to have brutal variations (Dirac) 
  
The technical details explaining those constraints are presented in [9]. The set of compliant 
distributions is denoted  ( ) where   is a parameter that measures the « remoteness » of a distribution 
from its symmetric projection. 
For such a distribution  , a tidying permutation, denoted   , is a specific permutation that enables to 
give a canonical form      of  , such form being useful to « synchronize » two distributions by 
transitivity. Again, technical details are given in [9]. One can just say here that it is linked to the 
quadratic matrix whose coefficient is  (   )  ∫      ( )  
 
[   ] 
, by minimizing 
∑      (   )
         ̅
    
    
( ∑     (   )
         ̅
) 
where    {    
 
 ⁄ }. 
 
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol: 
  and   are the legitimate partners. The steps of the protocol  (       ) are the followings: 
Step 1 – Deep Random Generation:   and   pick independently the respective probability 
distributions  and    ( ), so that  (resp.  ) is secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any 
observer other than   (resp.  ) beholding all the published information.   draws the parameter vector 
  [   ]  from .   draws the parameter vector   [   ]  from  . 
Step 2 – Degradation:   generates a Bernoulli experiment vectors   {   }  from the parameter 
vector  
 
 
.   publishes  .   generates a Bernoulli experiment vectors   {   }  from the parameter 
vector  
 
 
.   publishes  . 
Step 3 – Dispersion:   and   also pick respectively a second probability distribution   and    ( ) 
such that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ).  
is selected also such that ∫  ( )  
 
| | [ | | √   | | √ ]
 
 
 √ 
 in order to ensure that | | is not an 
unlikely value for  |
 
 
| (same for   by replacing   by   and   by  ).    (resp.   ) is used to 
scramble the publication of the tidying permutation of   (resp.  ).   (resp.  ) computes a permutation 
  [ ] (resp.    [ ]) representing the reverse of the most likely tidying permutation on   (resp.   ) to 
produce   (resp.  ). In other words, with  ,   [ ] realizes : 
   
    
∫ ( | )      
  ( )  
 
 
 
Then   (resp.  ) draws a boolean   {   } (resp.   ) and publishes in a random order (     )  
  (  [ ]   ), (resp. (       )   
  (   [ ]    )) where   represents the transposition of elements in 
a couple. 
Step 4 – Synchronization:   (resp.  ) chooses randomly    (resp.   )  among (       ) (resp. 
(     )). 
  
Step 5 – Decorrelation:   computes    
  
  ( )  
  ( )
 
,   computes    
  
  ( ) 
  
  ( )
 
.    and    
are then transformed respectively by   and   in binary output thanks to a sampling method described 
hereafter. At this stage the protocol can then be seen as a broadcast model with 2 Binary Symmetric 
Channels (BSC), one between   and   and one between   and   who computes a certain   , called 
 ’s strategy, that is to be transformed in binary output by the same sampling method than for   and  . 
It is shown in Theorem 1 of [9] that those 2 BSC are partially independent, which enable to create 
Advantage Distillation as shown in [5]. 
Step 5’ – Advantage Distillation: by applying error correcting techniques with code words of length   
between   and  , as introduced in [5], we show in Theorem 1 of [9] that we can then create 
advantage for   compared to   in the error rates of the binary flows resulting from the error 
correcting code. 
Step 6: classical Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification (IRPA) techniques then lead to 
get accuracy as close as desired from perfection between estimations of legitimate partners, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimitedly powered opponent, as shown in [4]. 
 
The choices of the parameters (       ) are theoretically discussed in proof of main Theorem in [9]. 
They are set to make steps 5, 5’ and 6 possible. 
The Degradation transformations   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 with     at step 2 are the ones that prevent the 
use of direct inference by the opponent, and of course, the Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents 
the use of Bayesian inference based on the knowledge of the probability distribution. The 
synchronization step 4 is designed to overcome the independence between the choices of the 
distributions of   and  , and needs that the distributions to have special properties (  ( )) in order to 
efficiently play their role. It is efficient in   ⁄  of cases (when   picks       and   picks       , 
which we will call favorable cases). And to prevent   from gaining knowledge of   , Dispersion step 
3 mixes    within (     ) with another permutation   [ ] (and     within (       ) with another 
permutation    [ ]) that (1) is undistinguishable from    knowing  , and (2) manages to make the 
estimation of   unefficient as shown in [9]. We denote the following set of strategies (invariant by 
transposition of (     ) or ( 
 
   
 
 )): 
  
  { (    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )) |    
  {   }  (      (     )  
  (     
 
 ))
  (    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 ))} 
Because of Deep Random assumption ( ) over the group {    } applied to the distribution of (     ) 
and (       ), the strategy of the opponent can thus be restricted to      
 . 
  is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the constraint and transformation 
applied on  in step 3 to make    and   [ ] indisguishable knowing   (same with    [ ],    , and  ). 
The synchronization step has a cost when considering the favorable cases:   knows that   and    are 
synchronized in favorable cases, which means in other words that   knows that an optimal (or quasi 
optimal) permutation is applied to   . This also means that in favorable cases, all happen like if when 
  picks     instead of  , the result of the synchronization is that   uses      instead of   . 
  
Starting from the most general strategy     
  for  , we also consider the following additional 
restrictions applicable to the favorable cases: 
 Restriction to the strategies of the form  (   ), because (  [ ]    [ ]) depends only on (   ) 
and not on  neither  , 
 And then restriction to the set of strategies such that        ( ) ( )      , in other 
words strategies invariant by common permutation on    . 
which leads to define the more restricted set of strategies: 
  (   )  {  [   ]
   | ( ( )  ( )              )   ( ( )  ( ))   (   )        } 
The step 5 is called Decorrelation because at this step, thanks to the Deep Random Assumption, we 
have managed to create a protocol that can be equivalently modelized by a broadcast communication 
over 2 partially independent (not fully correlated) BSC, as shown in the main Theorem in [9], and also 
that consequently, it is possible to apply error correcting techniques to create Advantage Distillation as 
established in [5]. 
We can use the following very basic technique to transform    and    in an intermediate binary flow 
as introduced in step 5: we can typically sample a value in [   ] like    or    with a gauge being a 
multiple of the variance  [(  |      
   |     )
 
]
 
 ⁄
  (
 
√  
). The multiplicative factor   is 
chosen such that : 
 
√  
 
 
√  
 
 
√ 
 
and therefore, each experiment of the protocol can lead respectively   and   to distill an intermediate 
digit defined by : 
  ̃  ⌊
  √  
 
⌋      ,   ̃  ⌊
  √  
 
⌋       
Regarding the legitimate partners, when   picks       and   picks       , the choice of    and 
   remain independent from    , so that   and   remain draws of independent Bernoulli random 
variables, then allowing to apply Chernoff-style bounds for the legitimate partners. When   picks 
     [ ] or   picks       [ ], this is no longer true and    or    become erratic, which will lead 
to error detection by error correcting code at step 5’. 
  
The heuristic table analysis of the protocol is then the following: 
   picks       among (     )   picks      [ ] among (     ) 
  picks        
among (       ) 
  and   respective estimations are 
close in ~100% of cases, and thus 
both obtain accurate estimation of the 
combined shared secret in ~100% of 
cases. 
 
  cannot make accurate estimation of 
the combined shared secret in at least 
~25% of cases (if   tries to have a 
strategy depending on 
(             ), then (  [ ]    [ ]) 
is indistinguishable from (      ) 
and is thus picked by   in 25% of 
cases. 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
detection and finally discarding. 
  picks       [ ] 
among (       ) 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
detection and finally discarding. 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
detection and finally discarding. 
 
This is a heuristic reasoning, and we must rather consider most general strategies 
 (                 ) and write the probability equations with the appropriate group transform, under 
Deep Random assumption, which is done in [9]. But this little array explains why we create partial 
independence between the BSC and consequently then an advantage for the legitimate partners 
compared to the opponent, bearing in mind that (     ) (resp. (       )) are absolutely 
undistinguishable knowing   (resp.  ), due to the fact that the distributions   and   (resp.    and   ) 
are unknown and thus also absolutely undistinguishable by  . 
 
The sampling method presented above has the drawback of the border effect. If the reference value    
is too close from one of the sampling frontier {
  
√  
}
   
, then the sampling process becomes 
unefficient. In order to avoid the border effect, one can bring a little improvement to the protocol by 
allowing   to publish : 
      
 
√  
⌊  
√  
 
⌋ 
and then to replace    by       
 
 √  
    in order to center    within the sampling comb. This 
of course results in applying the same transform on    and   : 
   
 
√  
⌊(   
 
 √  
   )
√  
 
⌋  
 
 √  
 
  
 
√  
⌊(  
 
 √  
   )
√  
 
⌋  
 
 √  
 
  
The publication of    does not bring any additional information to the opponent regarding the 
valuable secret information being the parity of ⌊  
√  
 
⌋. 
The reception of   ̃ as   ̃ by  , and as   ̃ by   corresponds to a broadcast BSC channel (we can easily 
see that the channels are BSC by remarking that changing   in   
 
√  
 inverses the digits and is 
independent of   ,   , and   ). That BSC can be modelized in a    (        ) ([9] Proposition 13) 
where the 3 independent BSC have binary error variables (        ) with respective binary error 
probability (        ). It has been shown by Maurer in [5] that in such model, if      then 
Advantage Distillation can be achieved thanks to error correcting methods, and consecutively perfect 
secrecy can be approached as close as desired thanks to Information Reconciliation and Privacy 
Amplification techniques. One can then use the non-optimal error correcting method described by 
Maurer in [5] to reconcile digit flow between the legitimate partner: the codeword     chosen by   can 
only be (       )  or (       )  depending on      or     .   publicly discards all decoded 
sequence    that is not (       )  or (       )  and obviously decodes accordingly      if 
|  |   , and      if |  |   . 
II. Extended protocol against active opponent 
The protocol   introduced in [9] and summarized in the former section is suitable to generate a 
common secret bit string   between the legitimate partners against a passive unlimited opponent. The 
parameters of  can be adapted so that,         
(i)  (     )    
(ii) | (     )  
 
 
|     
In order to generate  , the partners will execute a sequence of   rounds of   that can be serialized as 
follows: 
 
The purpose of generating   is of course to transmit a secret message  from   to  . The encryption 
function   ( ) can be simply     if one want the highest security offered by one time pad, or 
another symmetric key encryption scheme working with a shared secret key  . While we have shown 
that a passive opponent cannot gain knowledge of  , it is obvious that an active opponent can insert 
  
himself in the communication, first playing the role of   with  , which enables him to collect , and 
then, optionally, to play the role of   with   to transmit , or even a different message   to  . 
 
 
We will see now how to prevent this MITM attack with an extended version of the protocol  . 
The security model 
In our ‘active opponent scenario’,   still has unlimited computation and storage power, but is also 
capable to (i) delete messages from the public channel, (ii) introduce new messages in the public 
channel at destination of either   or  ; (i)+(ii) is also equivalent to the capacity to modify a message 
transiting from   to   or from   to  . 
  and   are equipped with a DRG, and also with a private ‘wallet’ that can contain a shared 
authentication secret  , that can be updated at any time by the wallet holder. It is assumed as a pre-
condition to the protocol that   and   have initially the same value    in their wallet. 
It is assumed that the opponent   has no access to (i) the content of a private wallet, (ii) anything 
computed or stored within a DRG. 
The goal of the extended protocol is to continue to ensure that,         
(i)  (     )    
(ii) | (     )  
 
 
|     
even with such an active opponent. 
Description of the extended protocol   
The extended protocol that we propose is possible only because of a specific non-reversibility property 
of  . Indeed it is shown in [9] (Lemma3) that, when the public information (   ) is given, with the 
assumption that the distributions are synchronized, then it is impossible to reversely determine   or   
with an accuracy equal to the one of a partner’s estimation.    is original because, unlike any other 
  
protocol that does not benefit from the non-reversibility property of Deep Random Secrecy,  it resists 
to opponents that are both unlimited and active MITM. 
The extension then consists in adding a mutual verification phase after the bit string   has been 
generated, and before transmitting the secret message . This verification is performed by: 
(i) dividing the shared secret into 2 independent piece (     ) (with  (  )   (  )  
 ( )  ⁄ ) 
(ii) sending from   to   (resp.   to  ) a verification code 
    (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } ) 
(resp.) 
    (   {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } ) 
(the characteristics of the verification function   will be discussed hereafter) 
(iii) verifying by   (resp. by  ) that the local computation 
    (   {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } ) 
(resp.) 
    (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } ) 
is equal to the received code (      ) (resp. (      ) 
(iv) using part of the entropy of   to renew (sending  (  )) a new value of the shared 
authentication secret    for a next round 
(v) storing by   (resp.  ) the new value of shared authentication secret    in its private wallet. 
 
Assuming that   ( )     ,  having a length bounded at each round by | |    , the common 
shared bit string must have length: 
| |   ( )     
in order to be able to fully renew the shared authentication secret   after each round. 
Design considerations for security 
The verification function   must have at least the following characteristics: 
Property 1: 
  
if {   (     ) }  {    (       )  }  are known, then 
 { | (  {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )   (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )}    
Property 2: 
if {   (     ) }  {    (       )  }  are known, and      
 ( (  {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )   (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } ))    ( )( ) 
Due to the non-reversibility property of  , it is not possible for   to keep    (     )  (resp. 
   (       ) ) unchanged when transmitting towards   (resp.  ) because then it is impossible to 
generate   and    (resp.   and    ) that would enable   to play the role of   vis à vis   (resp.   vis à 
vis  ) in determining          with unchanged transmitted public information    (     )  and 
   (       ) . Therefore,   has no other choice than to execute fairly   with both   and   in order to 
share a secret with either of them.   can try to adjust the value    of a guessed shared authentication 
secret, but due to the fact that there exists many possible values of    such that  
 (    {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )   (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } ) 
and 
 (    {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } )   (   {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } ) 
it is not possible for   to guarantee that 
 (    {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )   (   {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } ) 
and 
 (    {    (     )  }  {   (       ) } )   (   {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } ) 
for all  . 
One may question if it is possible for   to learn at least some bits of  . If   is not carefully designed, 
here is how   can learn even almost all bits of  . Assume for example that we choose: 
 (  {   (     ) }  {    (       )  } )   (  (    
 (      ))  (    
 ((     )  (       )  ))) 
  can then sacrifice the last instance     (       )   to control that        without knowing   , by 
resolving the equations:  
(    
   )  (    
      )  
 
  (    
    )  (    
   ) 
(    
 (     ) )  (    
   (       )  )  (       )   (    
 (     )  )  (    
 (       ) ) 
The interaction flows perform as follows: 
  
 
 
By proceeding as described above,   can gain the amount of knowledge of   given by performing 
correctly all instances except the last one, which will give 
 (    )  
   
 
 ( ) 
This attack is made possible because of the existence of transformation over {    (       )  }  and/or 
{    (     )  }  that can let   invariant independently of  . The design of   should then guarantee: 
Property 3: 
There does not exist any non-trivial transformation   applying on the space 
{    (     )       (       )  }  such that 
    (  {   (     ) }   ({    (       )  } ))   (   ({ 
 
  (     )  } ) {   (       ) } ) 
or 
    (   ({    (     )  } ) {   (       ) } )   (  {   (     ) }   ({    (       )  } )) 
 
We propose to use: 
    ( )  ((    )     )     
 (  )
  
 (  {   (     ) }  {   (       ) } )
 (    
 (      (      ̅)))  (    
 (       (      ̅)))
 (    
 (     (        ̅̅ ̅̅ )))  (    
 (       (          
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)))
 (    
 (      (        ̅̅ ̅̅ )))  (    
 (       (          
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅))) 
where   is a prime superior to  
 ( )
 , and {                                         } are random non-
zero integers, fixed as parameters of the protocol (not negotiated); they can typically be the successive 
outputs of a congruential generator to avoid to store all them in memory. The permutation     is 
  
written above with its canonical binary form to be able to compute it with arithmetic.       ̅ is a non-
linear form on    also involving   for each                        . {    ( )} is a well known universal 
hashing class of functions, thus benefiting from the good probabilistic properties of such class. 
The modularity structure of   in terms of using blocks of the form (      (      ̅)) and composing 
them by simple   is chosen on purpose; in case public information {   (     ) } are reused from a 
round to another, the associated block can be reused without re-computation of the arithmetical 
operations. This reuse technique will be illustrated in optimization techniques for  , presented in 
further work. 
Other considerations 
Eventually, note that the computation of   is obviously highly sensitive to errors in the transmission of 
the {   (     )     (       ) } , and therefore it is recommended to associate each {   (     ) } with 
an error control checksum. 
The size parameters  ( )      should also be fixed as parameters of the protocol and not negotiated, 
in order to avoid that they become also vulnerable to MITM attacks. 
 
III. Conclusion 
We have proposed an authentication scheme resisting to unlimited MITM attackers. This scheme is 
working in conjunction with a key exchange protocol and is only made possible by the very special 
non-reversibility property of Deep Random Secrecy. The scheme requires a prior shared authentication 
secret that is kept fully independent from the shared encryption key generated between the partners as 
the output of the protocol. The shared authentication secret has to be renewed after each round of the 
protocol for a full secrecy against unlimited opponent, and the renewal process is part of the protocol. 
This protocol is then suitable to replace protocols like TLS in scenarios where opponents are assumed 
unlimited (typically because equipped with quantum computers), but requires a prior registration 
phase between the partners to initialize the shared authentication secret. Such registration is quite 
realistic in practice (think about creating an online account for instance). However, one could question 
the poor level of performance (bandwidth, CPU) of the protocol to replace a popular protocol like 
TLS. 
The main performance concern is of course the quantity of information needed to generate an output 
shared key  . That quantity is superior to | |       (where   is a constant depending on IRPA 
method used in   ). In general, such a key exchange protocol based on Deep Random Secrecy and 
resistant to unlimited MITM cannot exceed a bandwidth performance of | |  ⁄ , where     is the 
Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9]. The question of optimization of   (and   ) in terms of getting 
close to   will be addressed in further work. 
The CPU performance question can be addressed by searching fastest possible functions   that verifies 
properties 1, 2 and 3. It can also be questioned if one can lower the requirement of Property 3 together 
with maintaining the security model; Property seems too much demanding at first sight compared to 
the objective because many transformations   could be harmless to the protocol. 
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